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provement in the Commission's program. However, there can be even
less doubt that there is a real need for someone to supervise this com-
petitive struggle. Given the structure of the industry, unrestricted price
competition at the retail level would not serve the best interests of the
public or of the oil companies concerned.
EFFECTIVE GUIDANCE THROUGH CEASE AND DESIST
ORDERS: THE T-V COMMERCIAL
Even before the advent of the television commercial, regulation of
false and misleading advertising represented one of the Federal Trade
Commission's most expensive and time consuming tasks.' Additional
problems have been presented to the Commission during the past fifteen
years2 as the infant television medium grew, if not to adulthood, at least
to adolescence. The phenomenal growth of the television medium is
demonstrated by the fact that in 1949 the amount spent for television
advertising amounted to only about one per cent of the total spent for
advertising in all media, while in 1961, television advertising accounted
for thirteen per cent of all advertising expenditures.' In 1960, suspect-
ing that the new medium might become a juvenile delinquent if not care-
fully disciplined, the Federal Trade Commission gave its widest attention
to eliminating deception in television commercials.4
Television has been described as the most effective selling tool ever
developed for reaching a mass audience at low cost.' In 1958 it was
estimated that 48,300,000 television sets were in use,6 with about 25,000,-
000 people viewing the average network evening program.7 As an
authoritative medium it carries considerable weight.' A 1951 study
showed that sixty-five per cent of the television owners interviewed con-
1. Moore, Deceptive Trade Practices and the Federal Trade Commission, 28 TENN.
L. Rxv. 493, 503 (1960).
2. Commercial TV started its first full year of operation in the United States in
1946. MCMAHAN, TV TAPE COMMERCIALS 11 (1960).
3. The total amount spent for television advertising in 1949 amounted to $57,800,000,
while in 1961 $1,615,000,000 was spent on advertising in this medium, or almost thirty
times as much. The amount spent for advertising in all media increased from $5,202,-
200,000 in 1949 to $11,845,000,000 in 1961, or only a little over twice as much. Guide to
Marketing for 1963, Printer's Ink, August 31, 1962, p. 384-85.
4. 1960 FTC ANN. RP. 6
5. MCMAHAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 43.
6. DIRKSEN & KROEGER, ADVERTISING PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS 241 (1960).
7. MCMAHAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 43.
8. BOGERT, THE AGE OF TELEVISION 195 (1956).
SYMPOSIUM
sidered television the most "convincing" medium.' This feeling is re-
flected in the willingness of local retail merchants to give television ad-
vertised brands preference on their shelves." The unique advantage of
television as compared to other advertising media such as radio, news-
papers, and magazines, is the opportunity for visual demonstration."
In some instances, however, the Federal Trade Commission felt that
the visual demonstration of a product's qualities and effectiveness, espe-
cially when compared with those of a competitor's products, grossly ex-
aggerated the merits of the advertiser's merchandise or unfairly dis-
paraged competitors' products." Under the Federal Trade Commission
Act, the Commission is obligated to prevent false advertising which mis-
leads, or has the capacity or tendency to mislead the purchasing public
into buying a product, process or method in the belief it is acquiring one
essentially different.' Charged with this duty, the Commission in 1960
9. Hofstra College Study in January, 1951, as reported in BOGERT, Op. Cit. supra
note 8, at 200.
10. As part of a study made in Fort Wayne, Indiana, NBC found that half the
local merchants named TV as the national advertising medium that did "the best job of
moving goods in a store," while newspapers, the runner-up, were named by only 17%.
As a result merchants began to favor the TV advertised brands by stocking items they
had not carried before, giving those brands better shelf space and putting up special
displays featuring the TV brands. A CBS survey in 1954 found that 63% of the 3,100
local merchants named TV as top choice, with grocers and druggists giving TV a par-
ticularly high vote of preference. BoGET, op. cit. supra note 8, at 196.
11. BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 8, at 194.
12. 1960 FTC ANN. REP. 53.
13. Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175, 181 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
668 (1941).
As originally enacted, section 5 of the FTC Act provided that "unfair methods of
competition in commerce are hereby declared unlawful." 38 Stat. 719 (1914) ; 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a) (1958). In FTC v. Raladam, the Supreme Court held that the Commission
could not proscribe false claims where no substantial injury to competition was shown
to have been occasioned by the false advertising. 283 U.S. 643 (1931). Because of pub-
lic agitation to broaden the Commission's powers following the Raladam decision, the
Wheeler-Lea Amendment was passed March 21, 1938, which amended section 5 to read:
"Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." 53 Stat. 111 (1938) ; 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)
(1958). (Emphasis added.)
It is the duty of the FTC to protect the general public-not only the prudent but also
the ignorant and unsuspecting purchaser. H. N. Heusner & Son v. FTC, 106 F.2d 596
(3d Cir. 1939). The Commission may insist upon the most literal truthfulness and has
the discretion to insist upon a form of advertising clear enough so that, in the words
of the prophet Isaiah "wayfaring men, though fools, shall not err therein." General
Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 682 (1940). The
unfair practice is misrepresentation and whatever constitutes it may be subject to cor-
rective measures by the Commission including misleading half-truths, P. Lorillard Co.
v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1950) and garbled testimonials, FTC v. Standard Educ.
Soc'y, 86 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1936), regardless of any actual intent on the part of the
seller to deceive the purchaser, FTC v. Balme, 23 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1928). The im-
portant criterion is the net impression which the advertisement is likely to make upon
the general populace. Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 163, 167 (7th Cir. 1943) ; Stanley
Labs., Inc. v. FTC, 138 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1943) ; FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302
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issued complaints against the manufacturers of nine nationally adver-
tised products alleging that either camera trickery had been used or es-
sential facts had been omitted from the television portrayal of their
products. 4 The Commission attacked these demonstrations on the
grounds that (1) the superiority claimed did not exist, and (2) the dem-
onstration did not prove what it purported to prove." In most of the
cases, both picture and script were challenged. 6
This action by the Commission represented an attempt to correct an
industry wide practice by instituting proceedings against the leading
members of selected industries and their advertising agents.' Rather
than use the various voluntary compliance procedures available, the Com-
mission chose instead to rely upon the mandatory cease and desist order
as a means of securing the compliance of the other members of the in-
dustry. By a joinder of parties, by the breadth of the order and, per-
haps most important, through the medium of the opinion accompanying
the order and the order itself, the Commission sought to establish
standards by which advertisers could gauge their conduct. Although it
is as yet too early to determine the effectiveness of such an approach, an
analysis of one of the nine cases instituted by the Commission in 1960,
may serve to indicate the merits of the mandatory approach.
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE COMPANY'S "SANDPAPER
TEST" COMMERCIAL
Among the television commercials challenged by the Commission in
U.S. 112 (1937); Newton Tea & Spice Co. v. United States, 288 Fed. 475, 479 (6th
Cir. 1923).
14. 1960 FTC ANN. REP. 6. The cases and the alleged misrepresentation were as
follows: Oluminum Co. of America, No. 7735, FTC (1960), (dried out ham used in
comparison demonstration with competitor's foil); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.,
56 FTC 956 (1960), (filter purported to absorb more nicotine than that of competitors) ;
Standard Brands, Inc., 56 FTC 1491 (1960), (moisture added to oleo and magnified to
show moistness of product) ; Eversharp, Inc., No. 7811, FTC (1960), (razor used with
boxing glove to prove safety of razor) ; Colgate-Palmolive Co., No. 7660, FTC (1960),
(coconuts bouncing off an "invisible" shield used to demonstrate protection of dental
cream); Lever Bros. Co., No. 7747, FTC (1960), (only fresh stains used in demon-
stration to show ability of toothpaste to remove smoke stains) ; Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
No. 7736, FTC (1960), (plexiglass mock-up rather than sandpaper used in shaving
demonstration) ; Carter Products, Inc., No. 7943, FTC (1960), (specially prepared
formula characterized as a competing lather and used to disparage competing shaving
lathers) ; The Mennen Co., No. 8146, FTC (1960), (mixture of toothpaste and shaving
cream used to demonstrate under water qualities of product).
15. 2 TRADE REG. REP. ff 7805 ( ).
16. 1960 FTC ANN. REP. 6-7.
17. In creating a program of enforcement the Commission, of course, must con-
sider the availability of men and funds. The appropriations for the year 1961-62 were
$8,009,500. The Commission with a staff of 855 at the end of the year had a backlog
still fourteen months behind after completing the investigations of 904 cases, instituting
292 complaints and issuing 272 orders. 1961 FTC ANN. REP. 2-3.
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1960 were three sixty-second advertisements of Colgate-Palmolive Com-
pany's "Rapid Shave."'" The complaint issued against the company and
its advertising agent, Ted Bates & Company, Inc., charged that the repre-
sentations in the commercials were deceptive. To the viewer each of
these commercials demonstrated the effective shaving of sandpaper with
a single stroke of the razor after the application of "Rapid Shave." In
reality what the viewer saw, however, was not sandpaper but sand on
plexiglass, termed in the trade as a "mock-up." The nature of the tele-
vision medium, respondents argued, forced the simulation. Sandpaper
appears on the television screen as nothing more than plain, colored pa-
per; therefore, respondents contended, unless a mock-up was used the
texture of the grain would not show and it would appear to the viewer
that only plain paper was being shaved instead of sandpaper.
The Commission put to one side any question as to the truthfulness
of the premise that a shaving cream which enables sandpaper to be shaved
cleanly and quickly is equally effective in shaving a man's beard. Rather,
the issues posed were (1) whether "Rapid Shave" could shave sand-
paper in the manner depicted, and (2) whether it was deceptive to the
public to conduct such a test on what was represented as sandpaper, but
was actually a plexiglass mock-up.
The Commission found, that sandpaper could not be shaved within
one to three minutes after application of "Rapid Shave," even with nu-
merous heavy strokes. Indeed, soaking for an hour in the respondent's
product would not permit the successful completion of the task.
From these facts the Commission concluded that the commercials
were false, misleading and deceptive within the meaning of section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, and that such representations had
the capacity and tendency to mislead members of the purchasing public
into the erroneous and mistaken belief that those representations were
true. In his opinion, Commissioner Elman pointed out that the use of
props in television commercials was not illegal per se. Specific examples
were used to illustrate the distinction between a misstatement of truth
that is material to the inducement of a sale and one that is not.' 9 There
18. Colgate-Palmolive Co. and Ted Bates & Co., Inc., No. 7736, FTC (1961). For
a discussion of this case and its effect on the use of mock-ups see: 72 YAL L.J. 145
(1962).
19. Ibid.
No one objects to the use of papier mhch6 sets to represent western saloons or
an actor's drinking iced tea instead of the alcoholic beverage called for by the
script. The distinction between these situations and the one before us is ob-
vious. The set designer is not attempting, through his depiction of the saloon, to
sell us a saloon, nor is the actor sipping at his drink, peddling bourbon. There
is a world of difference between a casual display of steaming "coffee" that is
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is nothing objectionable, for example, in showing a person drinking
colored water that appears to be iced tea, so long as the liquid is not
presented as proof of the fine color or appearance of an advertiser's tea.
The Commission concluded, however, that
In the discharge of the Commission's obligation to pre-
serve competition and protect the public against false, decep-
tive, or unfair advertising practices of the type here found to
be unlawful, it is necessary to prohibit respondents, in adver-
tising not only "Palmolive Rapid Shave" but any other product,
from further use of representations, by picture, depictions,
or demonstrations, either alone or accompanied by oral or writ-
ten statements, that do not genuinely represent what they pur-
port to represent and do not prove what they purport to prove
about the quality or merits of a product. (Emphasis added.) 2"
Accordingly, Colgate-Palmolive Company and Ted Bates & Com-
pany, Inc. were ordered not only to cease and desist from representing
that pictures, depictions, or demonstrations, either alone or accompanied
by oral or written statements, prove the merits of any product when such
is not the case, but also to cease and desist from representing such pic-
tures, depictions or demonstrations as genuine when in fact they are not.
These prohibitions were not limited to advertisements involving "Rapid
Shave" but covered any product advertised by either Colgate-Palmolive
Company or its advertising agent, Ted Bates & Company, Inc.
On appeal by Colgate and Bates, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit set aside the Commission's order.2 The court upheld the Com-
mission's findings that the commercials were a material misrepresenta-
tion in that they purported to demonstrate qualities which the product
did not in fact possess, i.e., the ability to permit sandpaper to be shaved
after an insignificant interval of soaking. On the other hand, while
agreeing that there is a misrepresentation, of a sort, in any substitution
really heated red wine (again, because of television's "technical difficulties"),
and a commercial showing a closeup of what is actually red wine to the ac-
companiment of a claim that the high quality of the sponsor's coffee is proved
by its rich, dark appearance-which the viewer can verify for himself simply
by looking at the "coffee" on the screen. Similarly, an announcer may wear a
blue shirt that photographs white; but he may not advertise a soap or de-
tergent's "whitening" qualities by pointing to the "whiteness" of his blue shirt.
The difference in all these cases is the time-honored distinction between a mis-
statement of truth that is material to the inducement of a sale and one that is
not.
20. Colgate-Palmolive Co. and Ted Bates & Co., No. 7736, FTC, Dec. 29, 1961.
21. Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. FTC; Ted Bates & Co., Inc. v. FTC, 310 F.2d 89
(Ist Cir. 1962).
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case, the court indicated that if the artificial substance merely compen-
sated for deficiencies in the photographic process in order to produce the
exactly correct appearance, then the misrepresentation was not a material
one. The court ruled that the Commission's order was so broad as to
make even these latter practices illegal, and remanded the case for a new
order. On February 18, 1963, the Commission issued its new order,
again holding that the practice of using a sham demonstration with mis-
leading effect is illegal.22
COMMISSION'S ENFORCEMENT METHODS
Cease and Desist Orders
Both formal and informal procedures are employed by the Commis-
sion in enforcing the FTC Act. Although the Federal Trade Commis-
sion is not justified in relying on a mere promise to discontinue an un-
fair method of competition,2" cases of lesser violations are often dis-
posed of by accepting from the proposed respondent written assurance of
discontinuance.24 Such a procedure sets no precedents, applies only to
particular cases, and is not publicized. In the instant case, such a pro-
cedure would have had limited effectiveness because the rest of the in-
dustry would not have been apprised of the Commission's decision that
the questioned practice constituted a material misrepresentation. A Trade
Practice Conference would have placed other advertisers on notice that
certain practices were questionable, but the rules promulgated by such
conferences generally are mere parroting of statutory language and are
not very meaningful to the average businessman who wants to know
what he can and cannot do from a practical point of view. 6 Questions of
business procedure should be effectively answered, whether by case law
or by official interpretation which binds government as well as business. 7
The Commission has issued Guides on various aspects of advertising,28
22. Commissioner Elman stated that the basis of the Commission's conclusion is
that "it is unlawful for advertisers to stage television commercial demonstrations that
purport to--but do not in fact, because of the undisclosed use of mock-ups or substitute
material-prove visually a quality or merit claimed by a product regardless whether the
product actually possesses such quality or merit." Colgate-Palmolive Co., No. 7736,
FTC, TRADE REG. P p. 1 16318 (Feb. 18, 1963).
23. Moir v. FTC, 12 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1926).
24. MooE, supra note 1, at 510.
25. Ibid.
26. MAsON, THE LANGUAGE oF DISSENT 291-92 (1959).
27. Ibid.
28. 1960 FTC ANN. REP. 7-8. Since the Guides Program got under way in 1955,
the Commission had issued Guides relating to (1) cigarette advertising, (2) tire ad-
vertising, (3) deceptive pricing, (4) bait advertising, (5) deceptive advertising of
guarantees, and (6) advertising allowances.
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but it has consistently maintained that such guides are merely suggestions
and not formal rules.29
The inherent dangers of these informal processes are illustrated by
Colgate-Palmolive's claim that the order is "directly contrary to the set-
fled rule of the Commission regarding the use of 'mock-ups' prior to its
decision in this case." 80 In making this charge, the company relied upon
three informal procedures utilized by the Commission in formulating
policy in this area.
First, the company asserted that for more than two and a half years
prior to the complaint it had been submitting to the Commission repre-
sentative samples of its advertising and television commercials, including
information on the "Rapid Shave" commercials and that no objection to
the commercials had been made by the Commission until the issuance
of the complaint.3 '
Second, the Commission conferred with members of the Association
of National Advertisers, Inc., in November, 1959, and stated that its
policy concerning television technology was that the
F.T.C. recognizes a rule of reason. . . . Incidental artifice re-
quired by the nature of the medium, for somewhat heightened
effects, etc., are not of concern to the Commission. . . . In
general, F.T.C. is not concerned with what goes on in the act of
bringing a TV picture to the screen-rather they are concerned
with what the viewer sees. 2
Finally, the company cited as approving the use of mock-ups a
statement of former Chairman Kintner quoted in Advertising Age:
We realize that it is often difficult to impart true life
quality to a product when it is photographed for television.
Where the use of props does not result in a material de-
ception, the Federal Trade Commission would have no reason
to complain.
Obviously, we recognize that it is impossible to photograph
ice cream properly under hot lights. If you have to use shaving
cream to get the kind of head which is normal on a glass of
beer, this probably would not represent a material deception
unless, of course, it was carried beyond a reasonable point. If
29. Massel, The Regulatory Process, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 181, 189 (1961).
30. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 5-6.
31. Id. at 5.
32. Brief for Respondent, pp. 12-13.
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a glass goblet glistens too much, we still aren't likely to be
alarmed. 3
It should be noted that there is nothing in either of these statements
that conflicts with the findings of the Commission or the ruling of
the court in the Colgate case. In the first one the Commission said that
its concern is "with what the viewer sees," and Chairman Kintner stated
that where the use of props does not result in a material deception, the
Commission would have no reason to complain. In the instant case,
however, the Commission found that the use of the mock-up did con-
stitute a material deception. Nevertheless, the combination of informal
expressions by the Commission might be interpreted by some to approve
the use of mock-ups whenever technical difficulties are encountered in
visually representing a product on television. The danger of relying on
such tacit approval is illustrated by the litigation which ensued when
Colgate used plexiglass instead of sandpaper to demonstrate the quali-
ties of its product.
In the Colgate case the Commission chose to employ the formal pro-
cedure prescribed in section 5 (b) of the Act and issue a cease and desist
order.34 There is no doubt that formal procedures are more time con-
suming than informal procedures. In the instant case, for example, the
commercials appeared late in 1959, and the complaint was issued Janu-
ary 8, 1960. Hearings were held October 25, 1960, and February 16,
1961. On December 29, 1961, the Commission reversed the initial de-
cision of the Hearing Examiner dismissing the complaint, and issued a
cease and desist order. A petition to review was filed in the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on March 2, 1962, and the
decision in that court was handed down November 20, 1962. More
than two years thus elapsed between the issuance of the original com-
plaint and the decision by the court." Yet if the case were settled by any
of the informal methods mentioned above, and the company later stepped
over the line, new proceedings would have had to be instituted and no
penalty could be imposed for the violation of the original agreement.
On the other hand, cease and desist orders set standards with which
33. Advertising Age, Nov. 23, 1959, p. 1.
34. 52 Stat. 111, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1938).
35. In its order, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated that "the Com-
mission's fundamental error so permeates the order that we think it best that an entirely
new one be prepared. We also think it best that the Commission be the one to do so."
Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. FTC, 310 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1962). Thus, the issues in this
case may not yet be fully adjudicated, even though the Commission did issue a new




other advertisers may voluntarily comply. They are publicized and serve
as notice of the proscribed action to others engaged in similar conduct.
The supporting opinions of the cease and desist order are especially valu-
able in setting up more definite and ascertainable standards.
Colgate-Palmolive contended that since it had withdrawn the com-
mercial upon the issuance of the complaint, the proceeding served no use-
ful purpose." An abandonment of a forbidden practice even before fil-
ing of the complaint, however, is no defense, especially when the order
is opposed on the merits.r Moreover, Commission orders are not de-
signed to punish for past transgressions, but to prevent illegal practices
in the future."8 Practices subject to the issuance of a cease and desist
order are not confined to those known to be unlawful before a complaint
is filed. The Commission has a duty to discover and make explicit those
unexpressed standards of fair dealing which the conscience of the com-
munity may progressively develop."0 Even if the order of the Commis-
sion is in contravention of its previously stated policy, there is no doubt
that the Commission has the power to change its mind as many times as
it believes inconsistency is in the public interest.4" A contention that a
complaint should be dismissed "because the Commission had not estab-
lished standards delineating deceptive practices in this field before the
proceeding was begun" has been held to be "so wholly lacking in merit
as to require no detailed discussion."41 The Commission is charged with
the protection of the public interest. The public interest should not be
allowed to suffer as a result of inadvertence or mistake on the part of
the Commission in the past.2 The Commission need not approve prac-
tices merely because they are of long standing and have not previously
been held to be unfair under section 5.43
Joinder of Parties.
The author of false, misleading and deceptive advertising may not
furnish customers with means of misleading the public and remain in-
sulated against responsibility for the resulting deception.44 Inasmuch as
36. Brief for Petitioner, p. 5.
37. FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 86 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1936).
38. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952).
39. FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 86 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1936).
40. MAsoN, TiaE LANGUAGE OF DISSENT 176 (1959).
41. National Clearance Bureau v. FTC, 255 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1958).
42. NLRB v. Baltimore Transit Co., 140 F.2d 51, 55 (4th Cir. 1944).
43. Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175, 181 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668
(1941) ; Hutchinson Chem. Corp., 55 FTC 1942 (1959).
44. Irwin v. FTC, 143 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1944). See also, FTC v. Winsted Ho-
siery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 494 (1922); cf. Howard Hunt Pen Co. v. FTC, 197 F.2d 273,
281 (3d Cir. 1952).
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advertising agencies may be responsible in part or wholly for the false or
misleading representations, the Commission has named advertising agen-
cies as parties respondent in a number of television advertising cases.4"
There is no question but that this is a proper procedure, and the Com-
mission has adopted this approach in cases since 1943.46
By joining the advertising agency, Ted Bates & Company, Inc., as
respondent with Colgate, the Commission attempted, as one attorney put
it, "To cover the waterfront, not just one pier."'47 The court of appeals
conceded that the Commission had jurisdiction and discretion to join the
advertising agency where it was an active if not the prime mover behind
the alleged deceptive practice. Nevertheless, the court indicated that it
would require knowledge on the part of the agent of the falseness of the
advertisement before the order could run as to him. The court also
indicated that the order would have to be limited to a specific product
rather than being framed in language broad enough to cover any product
advertised by any client of the agency, especially where there was no evi-
dence of any "method" or "practice" by the agency.
In its opinion on remand the Commission reiterated its view that
the agency was responsible for the preparation of the commercials and
that it had full knowledge not only that the claim was false but that the
"proof" offered to support it was a sham.4" The Commission prohibited
Bates from misrepresenting the qualities of Rapid Shave or other shav-
ing creams, but not other products. It recognized that the agency might
defend by showing that it neither had knowledge of the falseness of the
claim nor any reason to question its truthfulness.
BreadtA of Orders
In many cases the orders of the Connission have been limited to a
specific misrepresentation, sometimes prescribing a definite change in
the advertisement." The scope of relief against use of misleading words
45. 1960 FTC ANN. REP. 54. Staz-Set, Inc., 55 FTC 1427 (1959); Keele Hair &
Scalp Specialists, Inc., 55 FTC 1840 (1959); Hicks Pharmacal Co., 55 FTC 1695
(1959) ; Collins Hair & Scalp Experts, Inc., 54 FTC 599 (1957) ; Loesch Hair Experts,
54 FTC 575 (1957) ; Detroit Soda Prods. Co., 38 FTC 666 (1944) ; Trans-Pac Servs.,
Inc., 38 FTC 602 (1944).
46. CLARK, THE AnvmTisInG SMoIK ScrEN 14 (1943).
47. Advertising Age, Jan. 15, 1962, p. 94, col. 2.
48. Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. FTC, 310 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1962).
49. Colgate-Palmolive Co., No. 7736, FTC, TRADE REG. REP. 16319 (Feb. 18,
1963).
50. Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, 55 FTC 1840 (1959); Hicks Pharmacal Co.,
55 FTC 1695 (1959) ; Staz-Set, Inc., 55 FTC 1427 (1959) ; Collins Hair & Scalp Ex-
perts, Inc., 54 FTC 599 (1957); Loesch Hair Experts, 54 FTC 575 (1957); Foster-
Milburn Co., 51 FTC 848 (1955) ; Charles Antell Co., 50 FTC 543 (1953) ; Marlenes,
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or symbols is peculiarly within the province of the Commission."' Orders
to cease and desist should, however, go no further than is reasonably
necessary to correct the evil found to have been perpetrated and protect
competitors and the public.5" If the respondent has been engaged in con-
duct which leads to the conviction that it will continue to violate the Act
in related ways unless checked, the cease and desist order should be suf-
ficiently inclusive to stop the practices permanently. 3
Admittedly, the Commission's first order in the Colgate case was
broad. As the order was written, the advertiser and its agency were pro-
hibited from "misrepresenting in any manner directly or by implication,
the quality or merits of any product." The court set aside the order on
the ground that there was no showing of any "method" or "practice" ex-
emplified by the particular commercials, and, therefore, no basis for so
broad a prohibition."' Although not ruling on the question, the court in-
dicated that if mock-ups were illegal per se, then it might be appropriate
to enter an order forbidding all such demonstrations en masse.55 On re-
mand, the Commission took the position that a broad order covering mis-
representation was not only appropriate but necessary in view of the fact
that the use of misleading props in television commercials constitutes an
unlawful practice if they materially misrepresent that which they seek to
prove. 6  Had the Commission framed its order to cover any substitu-
tion in a commercial, there might have been some justification for one
attorney's comment that "this case can set a pattern which will put even
more teeth in the FTC Act than the dreaded temporary restraining order
that FTC Chairman Dixon is asking for authority to issue."5 " With the
limitation of the second order to the advertising of shaving creams, any
possible basis for legitimate objection was removed.
Inc., 50 FTC 460 (1953); The Miami Margarine Co., 47 FTC 1248 (1951); Detroit
Soda Prods. Co., 38 FTC 666 (1944) ; Trans-Pac Servs., Inc., 38 FTC 602 (1944).
51. APW Paper Co. v. FTC, 149 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 328 U.S. 193 (1945).
52. FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933).
53. Eugene Dietzgen Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
730 (1944).
54. It should be noted, however, that Colgate-Palmolive Company had previously
been cited by the Commission for misrepresentation in its television commercials. See
Colgate-Palmolive Co., No. 7660, FTC (1960), in which the bouncing of coconuts off
of an "invisible" shield to demonstrate the protective nature of dental cream was held
to be a misrepresentation.
55. Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. FTC, 310 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1962).
56. Colgate-Palmolive Co., No. 7736, FTC, TRADE REG. REP. 1 16318 (Feb. 18,
1963).
57. Advertising Age, Jan. 15, 1962, p. 1, col. 4. A bill was introduced in the 1961
session of Congress by Messrs. Steed and Patman, which would amend the Federal
Trade Commission Act to provide for the issuance of temporary cease and desist orders
to prevent certain acts and practices pending the completion of the Commission's pro-
ceedings. H.R. 8830 and H.R. 8831, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. (1961).
SYMPOSIUM
Opinions
The order of the Federal Trade Commission directing one engaged
in interstate commerce to cease and desist from certain unfair or decep-
tive practices need not chart a course of future action for those subject
to the order." The order may be framed in statutory language and
directed at a specific violation. Nevertheless, orders which enjoin only
a specific practice found to have been engaged in are subject to criticism
because of the inadequate guidance they provide and the danger that new
proceedings will have to be brought against closely related violations in
the future. As stated by President Wilson in his message to Congress
urging the creation of a Federal Trade Commission,
[B]usinessmen of the country desire something more than that
the menace of legal process in these matters be made explicit
and intelligible. They desire the advice and the definite guid-
ance and information which can be supplied by an adminis-
trative body, an interstate trade commission.29
The Commission has been criticized for adopting too narrow an
approach at times."° The United States Supreme Court has recognized
the need of the business community for more general guidance when it
stated that the Commission should in the light of its own policy and the
record translate the Act into a "set of guiding yardsticks."'" In the
Colgate case the Commission's opinion served as the instrumentality for
elaborating upon the practices proscribed in the order.6"
An advertising industry source has commented that in the Colgate
opinion the Commission "went out of its way to outline its philosophy
about television commercials, and thus may be said to have laid down
58. Zenith Radio Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 29 (7th Cir 1944).
59. President Wilson's message to a joint session of Congress on Jan. 20, 1914, as
quoted in MASoN, THE LANGUAGE OF DIsSENT 40 (1959).
60. 2 DAvis, ADmNiSTRATnVE LAW TREATISE 485-86.
61. See FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 493-94 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
62. In 1955 the Commission decided to issue an opinion in every case, whether the
result was an order to cease and desist or a dismissal. 2 DAvis, supra note 63. In Man-
co Watch Strap Co., Inc., No. 7785, FTC (March 13, 1962), the Commission again
through the use of the opinion, reexamined its position as to foreign origin of goods'
cases, and stated that in future cases it would take official notice of its own records to
the effect that in general there is a preference for products of domestic origin, thereby
relieving itself of the burden of proving that fact in each new proceeding that is brought.
Thus, in the future, if a product's foreign origin has not been clearly disclosed to pro-
spective purchasers, the burden will shift to the respondent to come forward with evi-
dence that in the particular circumstances no substantial segment of the buying public
believes or assumes that his foreign-made product, unmarked as such, is of domestic
origin, or is prejudiced by his failure to disclose its foreign origin.
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guidelines for those who wish to avoid its toils hereafter." 3 Soon after
the Commission's decision three attorneys prophesied that it probably
would have "extensive effects on the advertising business."" It was
thought by some that the decision would contribute to the you-can't-take
advertising-seriously image already too prevalent.6" However that may
be, many "gimmicks" previously used in television advertising were
dropped as the complaints were issued. For example, in before-and-after
demonstrations for detergents, whereas previously two identical garments,
one soiled and the other not, neither of which had been laundered, were
used, soiled clothes are now sent out to the laundry" before the second
photograph.
It is interesting to note that in contrast to the reaction of the legal
profession to the Commission's order in the Colgate case, advertising in-
dustry representatives did not foresee any important modification in ex-
isting commercials as a result of the decision." Television writers and
producers are of the opinion that by and large television commercials
now meet the standards the Federal Trade Commission laid down in the
63. Advertising Age, Jan. 15, 1962, p. 20, col. 1.
64. Advertising Age, Jan. 15, 1962, p. 1, col. 4.
65. Advertising Age, Jan. 15, 1962, p. 20, col. 1. The public, however, apparently
was not taking commercials too seriously before the order. It was said that about 50%
of the television audience disbelieves the claims in cosmetic commercials, and only about
25% of the viewers believe the claims of cigarette advertisers. MCMAHAN, THE TELE-
VISION COMMERCIAL. 24-25 (1954).
66. Advertising Age, Jan. 8, 1962, p. 1, col. 4.
67. Advertising Age, Jan. 15, 1962, p. 1, col. 4. For some time the industry had
realized that some advertising claims had almost reached the point of no return, but it
took television to underline the problem. The viewer is getting more discriminating;
he has become a pretty good judge of the "atmosphere" and quality of a commercial
and judges the advertiser's product by the caliber of the presentation. Viewers are wise
about photographic trickery and pride themselves on being able to spot "phoneys." They
are outspoken about extravagant claims and artificiality in all its forms in television
commercials. Thus, principles of advertising would dictate that commercials must be
more believable; demonstrations kept simple and honest; and camera tricks and special
effects avoided. There should be no implausible or unlikely claims.
As early as 1954, one book on television advertising listed the areas where the com-
mercial must change with the times. The move should be away from such things as
over-use of optical tricks; obviously paid "testimonials"; extravagant claims not sub-
stantiated; too-perfect results with the product, obviously gained through film trickery.
The move should be toward believability in honest claims; believability in demonstra-
tion of product; simple, useful information; better public relations building good will
and loyalty. MCMAHrAx, THE TELEViSIOx COMME CIAL 6, 20, 22, 23 (1954); BOGERT,
THE AGE OF TELEVISION 200 (1956).
As one advertising executive puts it, "With product differences becoming less dis-
cernible, advertising's primary job should be to plug the company first and the product
second. The people behind the product-the company, its skills, its services, its re-
liability and its delivery performance-must of necessity assume greater importance in
the eyes of buyers." Howard G. Sawyer, Vice President of Marketing Services of
Marsettler, Rickard, Gebhardt & Reed, Chicago, as quoted in Advertising Age, May 8,
1961, p. 24, col. 4.
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Colgate opinion, and improved techniques have eliminated the necessity
for many of the dubious visual practices once common. 8 The important
point, however, is that the industry recognizes the Colgate opinion as
establishing a standard by which it may govern itself in the future. It
would thus appear that the Commission was successful, by means of a
formal cease and desist proceedings, in providing a meaningful guide-
post for the advertising industry in regard to false advertising.
INTERSTATE DISSEMINATION OF ADVERTISING:
JURISDICTION WHICH MUST BE EARNED
Section 5 (a) (1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act declares un-
lawful all "unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in commerce. . . ."' False advertising is
recognized as an unfair method, act or practice within the meaning of
section 5 (a) (1).2 In addition, section 12 of the Act specifically makes
it unlawful to disseminate in commerce any false advertisement designed
to induce the purchase of foods, drugs, devices, or cosmetics.' If a false
advertisement relates to other commodities, the FTC has historically ex-
ercised jurisdiction under section 5(a) (1) where the sale is in interstate
commerce. For forty-six years after the passage of the Act, however,
the FTC did not attempt to assert jurisdiction over false advertising for
commodities other than those mentioned in section 12 where the dissem-
ination was interstate but the sale was intrastate.
68. Advertising Age, Jan. 15, 1962, p. 20, col. 1.
1. 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1958), amending 38 Stat. 719 (1914).
The FTC enforces this declaration by issuing cease and desist orders as provided under
15 U.S.C. § 45(6) (1958), and promoting voluntary compliance by a variety of tech-
niques.
2. Lighthouse Rug Co. v. FTC, 35 F.2d 163, 164 (7th Cir. 1929) ; Silver Co. v.
FTC, 289 F. 958 (6th Cir. 1923) ; Guarantee Veterinary Co. v. FTC, 285 F. 853, 857
(2d Cir. 1922) ; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307, 310 (7th Cir. 1919).
3. 52 Stat. 114 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1958) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation to dis-
seminate, or cause to be disseminated, any false advertisement-
(1) By United States mails, or in commerce by any means, for the pur-
pose of inducing, or which is likely to induce, directly or indirectly
the purchase of food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics; or
(2) By any means, for the purpose of inducing, or which is likely to in-
duce, directly, or indirectly, the purchase in commerce of food, drugs,
devices, or cosmetics.
(b) The dissemination or the causing to be disseminated of any false adver-
tisement within th eprovisions of subsection (a) of this section shall be
an unfair or deceptive act or practice in commerce within the meaning of
section 45 (section 5(a) (1)) of this title.
